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THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS
NEUTRAL RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN WAR, 1939-1941*
By C. H. McLAUGHLINf
III. VISIT, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
A PART from the problems involved in blockade, contraband and
continuous voyage there is another set of issues created by
the liberties which have been taken -with the law of visit and search,
interference with mails, and removal of enemy persons from
neutral vessels.
The traditional law of diversion permitted belligerents to force
a neutral vessel into port under escort or prize crew when visit
and search at sea revealed at least a prima facie case for con-
demnation of the cargo or vessel as prize. 58 During the World
War Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy all diverted
neutral ships into their ports without having obtained any evi-
dence of contraband carriage or suspicious circumstances by
preliminary visit and search at sea. The British Government began
with a suggestion that ships bound for Scandinavia should call
at British ports to "avoid the delay and inconvenience of being
stopped at sea." 1 5 By the end of 1914 it had progressed so far
as to set up ports of detention, or control bases, into which neu-
tral vessels were diverted for search. The reprisals Order in
Council of March 11, 1915, authorized the detention and diversion
*Continued from 26 AMfnNEsorA LAw REviEw 49.
As the proofs of these pages were being corrected the United States
abandoned its, formal status of neutrality and declared war upon Japan,
Germany and Italy. In the light of this country's more immediate problems
as a belligerent it is of course difficult to concentrate attention upon prob-
lems of neutrality. Whether neutrality as a legal status will survive the
present war and the peace settlement which terminates it, or whether the
United States will in any future war wish to occupy such a status, are
questions as yet unanswerable. Yet it may be well to recall that indifference
in the United States during and after the first World War to the problems
of 1914-1917, and preoccupation on the one hand with proposals for collective
security, on the other hand with isolationism even at the sacrifice of neutral
rights, were factors which contributed largely to the present chaotic condi-
tion of the law of neutrality and the consequent flagrant disregard of
neutral rights during the past two years. It would be rash to assume that
similar indifference today to the problems of neutrality will not some day
produce a like result.
tInstructor in international law, Department of Political Science. Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
lasSee generally Harvard Research, Neutrality, 578-601, where the
pertinent materials are collected.
'
59For. Rel., 1914, Supplement, 323.
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into British ports of all ships carrying goods presumed to have
enemy destination, origin, or ownership. 1 0 In the extensive cor-
respondence with neutrals which ensued the British Government
took the position that diversion into port for search was justified
by the physical difficulty of complete examination of large cargoes
at sea, as well as by changed conditions of warfare, including
danger of submarine attack during search at sea."6' A further
extension of the practice under the Order-in Council of February
16, 1917, whereby vessels carrying goods of enemy origin or
destination were made liable to condemnation if they omitted to call
at a British port, was placed frankly upon the ground of re-
prisal. 162 Proceedings under both these orders in council were
interpreted as reprisals by the British prize courts.103 Apart from
these special measures based upon reprisal, the usual practice of
the World War belligerents was to board the vessel at sea and
maintain control over it during its progress into port.104 In view
of this, and of repeated protests by the United States, The Nether-
lands, and the Scandinavian States, it can hardly be said that
the new practices obtained the acquiescence of neutrals. Subse-
quent consideration of the problem by the Hague Commission
of Jurists of 1923 revealed some disposition on the part of The
Netherlands and the United States to accept the practice of diver-
sion after preliminary boarding, but no agreement upon a draft
convention was reached.' 6'
During the present war the British established contraband
control bases at Weymouth, Ramsgate, Kirkwall, Gibraltar and
Haifa, and suggested to neutral shippers that examination of their
cargoes there would be expedited by having papers in good order,
including duplicate manifests in the English language, by avoiding
consignments "to order," and by providing a stowage plan of
the cargo. 66 These suggestions appear to have been offered in
the hope of inducing shippers to proceed to control ports volun-
1oOIbid., 1915, Supplement, 143; Savage, II, Document 54 (p. 274).
16'Harvard Draft, Neutrality. 590-593; For. Rel.. 1916. Supplement.
368, 382.
'
62For. Rel., 1917, Supplement 1, p. 493.
163The Stigstad, [19161 P. 123, [1919] A. C. 279, The Noordam.
[1919] P. 37, The Leonora, [1918] P. 182, [1919] A. C. 974. Also Th,"
Bernisse and The Elve, [1921] 1 A. C. 458.
164Harvard Draft, Neutrality, 597.
16Ibid., 597-598.
166Notices issued through British Consulate General, New York, Sep-
tember 11 and 12, 1939, CCH War Law Service, Nos. 65,501; 65,502. At
one time British authorities were considering the practicability of a Cana-
dian control port into which American vessels might be diverted. AP
dispatch, London. January 7, 1940.
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tarily in order to minimize delay. 1 7 Those ships which do not
acquiesce in the British arrangements may be compelled to com-
ply if intercepted by the vessels of the British contraband patrol.
But there has been no suggestion as yet, comparable to that of
the Order in Council of February 16, 1917, that a penalty might
be imposed upon a ship carrying goods of enemy origin or destina-
tion if it failed to call at a control port. The "navicert" system
of the World War has been revived, and vessels obtaining this
certification of the innocent character of their cargo from British
authorities at the port of origin are not required to call at control
ports.16 The same is true when vessels give the so-called "Black
Diamond guarantee" to submit goods to examination by British
officials at the neutral port of destination.8 9
On December 14, 1939 the Government of the United States
protested against the assumption by the British Government of a
right to divert American vessels to control bases in the combat
zone.'7 0 The secretary of state pointed out that in pursuance of
the terms of the Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939, the presi-
dent had designated a combat area around the British Isles and
the Northern Coast of Europe, which American vessels were
forbidden to enter. 17 He argued that in view of the prohibition
in the Act against carriage of goods to belligerent ports in Europe
and North Africa by American vessels they would necessarily be
carrying "only such cargo as is shipped from one neutral country
to another," and therefore "entitled to the presumption of inno-
cent character, in the absence of substantial evidence justifying
a suspicion to the contrary." The argument fails to take into
account the fact that such cargoes might be subject to condemna-
tion under the continuous voyage doctrine as having an ultimate
enemy destination. In any case it is a complaint founded upon
certain peculiarities of our domestic law, and does not go to the
root of the international law issue. A second protest on January
'fiCf. Jessup, The Diversion of Merchantmen, (1940) 34 A. J. I. L.
312, 313.
a6SA "navicert" is a certificate issued by British authorities in the
neutral port of export after satisfying themselves that there is no
ground for interception of the ship. The system was used in the World
War; see Ritchie, The "Navicert' System During the World War
(Carnegie Endowment, 1938). For the regulations reviving the system
see CCH War Law Service, Nos. 40,620, 65,556, 66,005, 66,015. The
"navicerts" are issued through British consulates for a fee of $2.00.
1-60The guarantee derives its name from the Black Diamond Steam-
ship Line, which first employed the device in the present mar.
1702 Bulletin 4-5. The Moore-McCormack line ship Mornmacsm, had
been diverted into the control port of Kirkwall, within the combat area.
'Z'For the proclamations defining combat zones, see notes 70 and 104.
supra.
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20, 1940, expressed "serious concern" over unduly long deten-
tions of American ships at Gibraltar, which appeared to be dis-
criminatory treatment in view of the more expeditious examina-
tion of Italian vessels.1 2 This of course contributes nothing to
the basic issue.
The related problem of interference with the mails carried by
neutral ships has attracted special attention. The Eleventh Hague
Convention of 1907 provided that postal correspondence inter-
cepted on the high seas should be treated as inviolable and prompt-
ly forwarded, whether public or private, neutral or belligerent,
and irrespective of the belligerent or neutral character of the
ship."7 3 This sweeping provision was not in force during the
World War and was not observed. Neutral vessels carrying
American mail directly to or from Scandinavian and other North
Sea neutral states were brought into British ports, where the
mail was censored or removed. This practice was the subject of
protests by Secretary of State Lansing on January 4 and May
24, 1916,174 in the course of which he denied that diversion of
vessels into British ports could invest the British authorities with
greater rights to examine mail than they would possess on the
high seas. Yet he made damaging admissions. The British Govern-
ment had professed to desire no interference with genuine corre-
spondence, but felt that its right to examine mail bags in order
to detect contraband secreted there was not contrary to the Hague
ConventionY.15 Lansing agreed "that the class of mail matter
which includes stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities is
-2z2 Bulletin 93-94. At that time the average delay imposed upon
American vessels at Gibraltar was over 12 days. It was subsequently re-
duced to 2 or 3 days.
17.Eleventh Hague Convention, 1907:
"Article 1. The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents,
whatever its official or private character may be, found on the high seas
on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained,
the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay.
"The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply, in case ol
violation of blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from
a blockaded port.
"Article 2. The inviolability of postal correspondence does not exempt
a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime war as to
neutral merchant ships in general. The ship, however, may not be
searched except when absolutely necessary, and then only with as much
consideration and expedition as possible."
Ir4Lansing to Page, January 4, 1916, For. Rel., 1916, Supplement,
592, Savage, II, Document 150 (p. 432) ; same to same, May 24, 1916,
For. Rel.. 1916. Supplement, 607-608.175Ibid., 601 :
"2. That the inviolability of postal correspondence stipulated by thc
eleventh convention of The Hague of 1907 does not in any way affect the
right of the Allied Governments to visit and, if occasion arise, arrest
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to be regarded as of the same nature 'as merchandise or other
articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent
rights. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable
instruments which may pass as the equivalent of money are, it is
considered, also to be classed as merchandise."'17 This admission
of course implied that sealed letter mail could be opened in order
to determine whether this class of "merchandise" was present,
and thus had the practical effect of opening letter post to the same
form of contraband control as that applied to postal packages
and cargo. It is not surprising that the British Government has
now resumed the practice of removing mails at control ports and
subjecting them to contraband inspection, nor that a protest by
Secretary Hull on January 2, 1940'"" should have been answered
by Great Britain in terms nearly identical with the language of
its World War notes on the subject."-- German sources are re-
ported- to have suggested that as a counter-measure the United
States might return undelivered to England and France a num-
ber of mail sacks equal to those confiscated or held up by the
British and FrenchY17 9 Despite- its source the suggestion prob-
ably indicated the only type of protest which would now carry
any weight.
What the merits of the British position may be from a prac-
tical point of view is not wholly clear. Officials of the Ministry
and seize merchandise hidden in the wrappers, envelopes, or letters con-
tained in the mail bags.
"3. That true to their engagements and respectful of genuine 'cor-
respondence,' the Allied Governments will continue, for the present, to
refrain on the high seas from seizing and confiscating such correspondence,
letters, or dispatches, and will insure their speediest possible transmission
as soon as the sincerity of their character shall have been ascertained."
I7CIbid., 607-608:
"The principle being plain and definite, and the present practice of
the Governments of Great Britain and France being clearly in contraven-
tion of the principle, I will state more in detail the position of the Govern-
ment of the United States in regard to the treatment of certain classes
of.sealed mails under a strict application of the principle upon which our
Governments seem to be in general accord. The Government of the
United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter
which includes stocks, bonds, coupons, and similar securities is to be re-
garded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of prop-
erty and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. Money orders.
checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments which may pass
as the equivalent of money are, it is considered, also to be classed as
merchandise. Correspondence, including shipping documents, money-order
lists, and papers of that character, even though relating to 'enemy supplies
or exports,' unless carried on the same ship as the property referred to,
are, in the opinion of this Government, to be regarded as 'genuine cor-
respondence,' and entitled to unmolested passage."
1772 Bulletin 3-5. 172 Bulletin 91-93.
379N. Y. Times, January 24, 1940, p. 6:5.
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of Economic Warfare asserted that large quantities of contraband
had been found in American letter mail to Germany, including
cash, securities, and industrial diamonds. 80 Attention was also
directed to the activities of German organizations in the United
States which accepted money from German-Americans and placed
orders in neutral European countries for food shipments to per-
sons in Germany.' On the other hand it appears probable that
with the exception of a few valuable articles of small bulk such as
industrial diamonds, not much contraband can be excluded by
censorship of letter post. Transfers of credits can be effected by
cable or if necessary by wireless, so that it is hardly conceivable
that substantial sums would be entrusted to the mails at pres-
ent.1 12 However, this may be, it can have no proper bearing upon
the legal issue, for the principle of inviolability of postal corre-
spondence is based upon other considerations.
An interesting contribution to the solution of this problem
has been made by the Inter-American Neutrality Committee. On
December 26, 1940 the Brazilian merchant ship Alirante Alex'-
andrino, bound for Vigo, was visited and searched near the coast
of Spain by French naval officers. They removed twenty bags of
Brazilian mail destined for Germany. After unsuccessfully pro-
testing to the Government of France the Brazilian Government
referred the question to the committee. It examined the history
of the problem carefully,' 83 concluding
"that the principle obstacle to the observance by belligerents
of the principle of inviolability arises from the fact that neutrals
do not draw a distinction between epistolary correspondence and
other postal communications which, intermingled with the former,
are transported by mail, and that from the confusion which this
intermingling produces, there results as a consequence that the
belligerent, in exercising the right of search for and seizure of
contraband, does not confine himself to packages, parcel-post and
articles of declared value, but extends it to the seizure and
examination of all mails, improperly including correspondence to
which the principle of inviolability applies."'8 s4
lSOIbid., January 25, 1940, p. 1. 18lbid.82Appatently the censorship drives transmission of money from mail
to cable or wireless. Thus the president of Fortra Corporation candidly
admitted that the company stopped using the mails because of the British
control system and then transacted its business of sending food packages
to German nationals by wireless. That is, a credit was established by
wireless in a neutral country adjacent to Germany, where the food
was bought. N. Y. Times, January 23, 1940, p. 4:2.
'
8 3See the preliminary statement preceding its draft resolution of May
31, 1940, (1940) 34 A. J. I. L., Supplement, 135-137.
184Ibid., par. 6.
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To meet the difficulty the committee proposed that the American
Republics should reaffirm the principle contained in the Eleventh
Hague Convention, but should themselves undertake to apply a
practical means of segregating and identifying the nature and
destination of the epistolary correspondence which should be in-
violable.8 5 This would be done by the creation of
"a special postal service of epistolary correspondence destined
to belligerent countries or occupied by them, which services shall
carry only letters, business papers or postal cards, and shall not
include any of the objects enumerated in paragraph 4 of article 34
of the Universal Postal Convention in Cairo of 1934, namely:
bank-notes, paper money or any values payable to the bearer;
manufactured or unmanufactured platinum, gold or silver; pre-
cious stones, jewelry, or other precious articles, merchandise of
any kind, no matter how insignificant the value. ' 11sO
Mail bags of this service, containing only epistolary correspon-
dence, would be marked C. E. and equipped with a control seal
and a large pink label bearing the words "correspondance 6pisto-
laire."' s7 In future American mails should exclude from pouches
containing correspondence destined to neutral non-American states
all objects whatsoever addressed to places in belligerent states or
areas occupied by them.18s Despite the administrative burden
which such a plan would impose upon the neutral state, it might
well be thought more satisfactory than continued submission to
the examination of letter post by belligerent censors. Presumably
such a plan, if carefully administered, would not prove unaccept-
able to belligerents.
A new application of the problem has occurred as a result of
the removal of air mail from the transatlantic clippers by British
censors in the crown colony of Bermuda.8 9 Although difficulty
has been avoided by a decision of Pan American Airways to
abandon the Bermuda call when weather conditions permit, the
situation holds interesting implications. Since it is physically im-
possible to visit and search transatlantic planes in midoccan, the
only possible method of contraband control would be by diversion
into an appropriate port. 90 In view of the present method of
:SIbid., 137-139; Resolution, Articles I and II, pr.
1 SIbid., Article II (a). 1S-Ibid., Article II (b). ISsIbid., Article II (c).
1892 Bulletin 196; N. Y. Times, January 19, 1940, p. 1, .March 29,
1940, p. 1.
39OThere would be no difficulty in forcing them down, but this could
not be done in mid-ocean without danger to the planes, or the risk that
they might be unable to take off again. Even if the clipper were forced
down the interceptor plane might have no facilities for proceeding with
a search. For abandonment of the Bermuda call see N. Y. Times, March
10, 1940, p. 1.
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contraband control as applied to ships, and the expressed inten-
tion of the British to search mails for contraband, it would seen-
a logical application of their position to attempt forcible diversion
of the clippers into Bermuda or perhaps Gibraltar. 191 Should this
occur the Government of the United States ought to consider
seriously whether so notorious an extension of practices which it
now tolerates under protest should be permitted to pass without
positive action. No practical solution is perceived whereby this
government could acquiesce in the diversion of aircraft into con-
trol bases without virtual surrender of its neutral rights in aErial
commerce.
The question of the right of a belligerent to remove from
neutral vessels on the high seas enemy persons not embodied in the
armed forces of the enemy need not be dealt with at length here.
It involves two issues: on the one hand whether a right of re-
moval exists under any circumstances without bringing the vessel
into port for adjuditation; on the other hand what classes of
persons the belligerent is entitled to intercept. During the World
War removal of persons from American ships by British war-
ships led to an interesting exchange of notes in which the British
Government expressed the view that removal was not an illegal
practice and was in fact more advantageous to neutrals than the
expensive and slow process of diversion into port for adjudica-
tion.' 5 2 Furthermore it advocated the right to remove not only
persons embodied in the enemy armed forces but also, as a
logical extension, reservists or even persons liable to military
service or of military age and character.19 On these points no
agreement seems to have been reached, and the legal issue re-
mained unsettled at the end of the war. 194
On January 21. 1940 a British warship removed twenty-one
Germans from the Japanese steamship Asamna Mare. This incident
9The news reports of the removal of clipper mail indicated that
Bermudan authorities had exhibited armed force when the pilot demurred.
The official Department of State release, however, denied any infornma-
tion of a show of force. References in note 189.
92See especially British note of May 31, 1917, For. Rel., 1917, Supple-
ment I, 530.
93See British notes in the Piepenbrink case, For. Rel., 1915, Supplement,
744, and in the case of removal of enemy nationals from the American vessel
China, ibid., 1916, Supplement, 634, 643, 653.
194See generally, Harvard Research, Neutrality, 612-618, where the
whole correspondence is summarized, with numerous extracts. Also 2 Hyde,
International Law 639-643.
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occurred when the ship was only thirty-five miles from the
Japanese coast and seems on that account to have aroused special
indignation. 95 On the legal point the Japanese contended that
only members of the enemy armed forces could be intercepted,
whereas the British considered that evidence of the liability of the
Germans to military service and their technical training in marine
engineering was a sufficient indication of the service which would
be required of them. However, a compromise was reached whereby
nine of the men found to be "relatively unsuitable for military
service" were released in return for assurances that Japanese
shipping companies would in future refuse passage to members
or suspected members of the enemy armed forces. Both govern-
ments reserved their legal rights. 9 6 In Japan the settlement led to
severe criticism of Foreign Minister Arita, 7 and seems not to
have been fully observed by Japanese vessels. 96
On December 17, 1939, a German warship removed from an
Estonian vessel Mr. Gordon Vereker, counselor of the British
Embassy in Moscow, who was then en route from Moscow to a
new post as minister to Bolivia. 99 After detention at Swinemfinde
for about ten days he was released, apparently after the German
Government had satisfied itself that the British Government was
not detaining diplomatic officers passing through its control
195See British White Paper, Japan No. 1 (1940), Correspondence ...
regarding the Removal of German Citizens from the Japanese Ship
Asaina Mari, January-February, 1940 (Cmd. 6166); London Times, Feb-
ruary 7, 1940, 10:2-3; N. Y. Times, January 24, 1940, January 26, 3:1.
Also Briggs, Removal of Enemy Persons from Neutral Vessels on the
High Seas, (1940) 34 A. J. I. L., 249-259.
'
96Craigie to Arita, February 5, 1940, British White Paper, loc. cit.;
Prime Minister Chamberlain in House of Commons, February 6, 1940,
London Times, same date, 8:2.
1
97 A disturbance amounting almost to a riot occurred in the Japanese
Chamber of Deputies on March 19, 1940, when Arita declined to answer
certain questions put to him on the case. N. Y. Times, March 20, 17:2-3.
'
9 sOn February 3, 1940 the liner Kawakura Mari arrived in Hono-
lulu, carrying sixteen Germans, who had been accepted as passengers on
the intervention of a German consul after signing statements absolving
the carrier of any liability in case of interception and removal. N. Y.
Times, February 4, 1940, 24:6. On February 18, thirty German officers
and seamen en route from Valparaiso, Chile to their homes reached
San Pedro, California on the Nippon Yusen Heiyo liner Heiyo Mar,
and -were expected to continue on it to Kobe. Ibid., February 19, 1940. 6:4.
These may, however, have been instances in a transitional period, for in
April, 1941 the Nippon Yusen Kaisha line refused to accept certain
German nationals of military age, who thereafter took passage on the
American liner President Garfield, from which they were removed. Ibid.,
May 1, 1941, 1:4.
199Ibid., December 18, 1939, 4:3, December 19, 10:6.
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ports.200 It is not known whether any protest was made by the
Estonian Government.20
1
Other instances of internment of enemy persons, including
several traveling on ships of United States registry, have oc-
curred but seem not to have produced diplomatic exchanges. 2 0 2
It is believed that the position taken by the Japanese Govern-
ment against removal of persons not embodied in the enemy
armed forces or holding some commission as agents of the enemy
state continues to be the correct view of the law, despite belligerent
pretensions to a broader right during the World War.20 3 On the
other hand it cannot be said that the present status of the law
commends itself as a practical solution of the problem. To require
diversion of the ship into port for adjudication is probably not in
20O0bid., December 28, 1939, 6:6.
20 The release was effected through the efforts of the United States
Embassy in Berlin, which had assumed the representation of British inter-
ests after the outbreak of the war. A London report stated that it was
based upon a reciprocal agreement under which diplomats of belligerent
nations travelling to their posts on neutral ships would be permitted to
pass. Ibid.
202British naval authorities arrested on board the liner Nicuw Amster-
dain two reputedly notorious German spies, and interned thirty-four German
stewards and members of the crew, but no complaint could have been
made as to the method of removal, for it occurred in the Downs, where
inspection of cargo was taking place. Ibid., September 17, 1939, 45:8.
The same would be true of removal of three Germans from the American
ship Exochorda at Bermuda, ibid., September 1, 1940, 13:1. Twenty-five
Germans were reported to have been removed from the Portuguese liner
Cavalho Araujo while en route from the Azores to Germany, ibid., De-
cember 11, 1939, 10:2. In the case of the President Garfield, referred to in
note 198, supra, a Canadian auxiliary cruiser, the Prince Robert, re-
moved four German aviators about 400 miles from Honolulu. Ibid., May I,
1941, 1:4.
-
03Apparently the British Government did not itself aver that the
established rule of law permitted removal of others, but rather hoped to
persuade neutral states to accept a more liberal principle. Thus. in his
note of May 8, 1916, Grey remarked:
"His Majesty's Government do not desire to raise any question of
altering the established international rule in this respect without the con-
sent of other governments; but it may be suggested that the organized
activity of enemy agents in this war, their ubiquity, their ingenuity, viola-
tions of neutrality perpetrated or planned by them, have made more dif-
ficult, more complicated and more invidious than ever before, the respon-
sibility of neutral governments for any breaches of neutrality connuitted
or attempted in the territories. It is suggested in view of the experiences
of this war, that the American Government might find it not unreason-
able to consider whether in future years there should not by international
agreement be allowed some greater power in controlling the movements
of enemy subjects across the seas, at any rate in cases where there
is prima facie evidence of [intent] to use neutral territory to commit
criminal or hostile acts."
In view of the refusal of the neutrals to acquiesce the law of course
stood in its original form.
THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS
the interest of either party.20 ' Nor is it reasonable to expect bel-
ligerents to content themselves with artificial categories of per-
sons liable to interception -when these may exclude individuals
whose services to the enemy state are of great importance. It is
believed that agreements containing more precise definition of
these categories, coupled with examination and certification of
enemy persons by officers of the neutral state at the port of de-
parture, would contribute to a more satisfactory treatment of the
problem.20
5
IV. VIOLATION OF NEUTRAL PORTS AND WATERS
In two much publicized incidents, the cases of the City of
Flint and the Altinark, questions relating to the status of neutral
ports and waters have been raised.
The American steamship City of Flint was captured by a
German warship in mid-Atlantic on October 9, 1939 while en
route from New York to London with a cargo admitted to be
partly contraband.20 6 No question has been raised of the propriety
of the capture, or of diversion of the ship to a proper port for
proceedings in prize. A German prize crew was put aboard and
took the ship into the harbor of Troms6, Norway (then neutral).
2 O4This point was strongly expressed by the British Government dur-
ing the World War correspondence, For. Rel., 1917, Supplement 1, 531-532.
In fact it may be doubted that states would rely exclusively upon the
ground that deviation of the vessel and prize court proceedings are re-
quired, for the point has usually been injected into diplomatic exchanges as
a subsidiary argument in a case initially based upon the non-military char-
acter of the persons removed. See Briggs, Removal of Enemy Persons from
Neutral Vessels on the High Seas, (1940) 34 A. J.I. L. 249, 254-55.2 05 Cf. 2 Hyde, International Law, 641-642; Harvard Draft, Neutral-
ity, Article .62 (p. 601) ; Briggs, Removal of Enemy Persons from Neutral
Vessels on the High Seas, (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. 249, 258-59.
-
06The U. S. Maritime Commission, owner of the ship, stated that it
carried a general cargo comprising more than fifty items, including lard.
cereals, canned meats, flour, canned goods, apples, %vax, lubricating oil,
cotton, sewing machines, plows, asphalt, pitch, grease, shade rollers,
machinery, silk, commercial chemicals, abrasive grains, disinfectants, feathers.
coffee, lumber, gauze, hair and wall board. N. Y. Times, October 24, 1939.
p. 1. Apparently the percentage of the cargo which could be considered
contraband under the German list (which sufficiently coincided with the
United States list of 1917 to obviate difficulties on that score; see note
121 and text, pp. 44-45) was small, but the German Government took
the position that the rule permitting confiscation of the ship only when
more than half the cargo is contraband (supra, note 72) applied only
to the deliberations of the prize court, not to the right of capture (state-
ment in N. Y. Times, October 27, 1939, p. 6). This is dubious doctrine,
for there ought to be circumstances creating reasonable suspicion that
the vessel is liable to condemnation. Whether this seemed to be the case
after preliminary examination at sea we do not know, and the point was
not pressed. For the facts generally see 1 Bulletin 429-432, 457-458; Hyde,
The City of Flint (1940), 34 A. J. L L. 89-95.
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After a short stop to take water they proceeded to the Arctic port
of Murmansk, in the U. S. S. R. (also then neutral). There the
prize crew seems to have been interned for a brief period, then
released. The Murmansk authorities detained the City of Flim
for five days, during which the Soviet Government apparently
was considering the views expressed to it by the Governments of
Germany and the United States.20 Then the ship was returned to
the control of the prize crew and ordered to leave Murmansk.
It moved southward along the Norwegian coast escorted by a
Norwegian torpedo boat. At Haugesund the commander of the
prize crew asked permission to stop in order to obtain medical
treatment for a sick man. When it appeared that the man in ques-
tion had no more serious affliction than a minor abrasion of his
leg resulting from his having fallen over a barrel, the Norwegian
authorities ordered the commander to proceed. Nevertheless lie
anchored at Haugesund on the evening of November 3. Conse-
quently, the Norwegian Government, acting on the basis of Articles
21 and 22 of the Hague Convention (No. 13) of 1907 Concern-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval War,
ordered the prize crew interned and the ship released to its
American crew. It proceeded to Bergen, Norway and later re-
turned safely to the United States.
Although the German Government sought to justify taking
the City of Flint into Murmansk, first upon the ground that it
lacked charts for navigation in waters adjacent to Germany,
and later upon the ground that there was immediate need for
repair of defective machinery, neither of these alleged difficulties
seems an adequate explanation of the choice of so remote a l)ort
as MXurmansk. The more probable inference is that the German
Government hoped to sequestrate the prize there, )ending the
decision of a prize court. Provision for such sequestration was
made in article 23 of the Thirteenth Hague Convention in the
f-lowing terms :211
207Mr. Steinhardt, United States Ambassador at Moscow, reported
that during this period he made repeated efforts to obtain information
about the case from Soviet officials and to establish connections with the
captain of the City of Flint, but found the government very unco6perative
Finally Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs Potemkin informed him
that the ship entered the port of Murmansk because of damage(] machinery
making her unseaworthy, and had been ordered when fit to put to sea
to leave on the same basis as she entered. Potemkin considered it would
be an unneutral act to turn the vessel and cargo over to the American
crew unless the German prize crew refused to take her out. 1 Bulletin
430-431.
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"Article 23. A neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its
ports and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, when they
are brought there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a
Prize Court. It may have the prize taken to another of its ports.
"If the prize is convoyed by a warship, the prize crew may
go on board the convoying ship.
"If the prize is not under convoy, the prize crew are left at
liberty."
Germany, Russia, and the United States were all parties to this
Convention, but the United States ratified it only under reserva-
tion that it declined to accept article 23.20  Consequently this
provision cannot properly be invoked against a captured American
vessel unless it can be established that article 23 was merely
declaratory of existing international law and proposed no new
rule. This quite certainly was not the case.210
It is believed, therefore, that the Government of the U. S. S. R.
had no right to permit sequestration of the City of Flint, and
ought to have ordered its prompt release. The Norwegian Gov-
ernment was fully justified in refusing to permit the ship to re-
main in port in the absence of any showing of "inability to
navigate, bad conditions at sea, or lack of anchors or supplies."211
No reason for anchoring at Haugesund was advanced which in
any way justified disregard of Norwegian regulations. It is not
20836 Stat. at L. 2415. The purpose of the provision wvas humanitarian;
it was designed to facilitate taking ships into port for adjudication in cases
where remoteness of or difficulty in reaching the belligerents' ports would
otherwise lead to destruction of the prize. See Report of Mr. Renault
in behalf of the Third Commission, to the Second Hague Peace Con-
ference, Deuxime Confrence Internationale de la Paix, Acles et Docu-
nents, I, 320-321. See Harvard Research, Neutrality, 448-458, for a survey
of previous practice.
209Resolution of Ratification by the Senate, 2 Malloy, Treaties, 2366.
Report of the American delegates to the Second Hague Peace Conference
of 1907, to the Secretary of State, For. Rel., 1907, I, 1144, 1173.
2 0Harvard Research, Neutrality, loc. cit. See particularly the well-
known case of The Appam, (1917) 243 U. S. 124, 37 Sup. Ct. 337, 61 L.
Ed. 632 in which the right of a belligerent to sequestrate a prize in a
United States neutral port pending determination by a prize court was
denied.
-llStatement by Norwegian Government, November 5, 1939, in N. Y.
Times, November 6, 1939, 2:3-5. It acted in accordance with its view of
the requirements of the Thirteenth Hague Convention, Article 21 of
which is as follows:
"Article 21. A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on
account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions.
"It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry
are at an end. If it does not, the neutral Power must order it to leave
at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral Power must employ the means
at its disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the
prize crew."
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understood that the Norwegian Government prohibited continu-
out transit through its territorial waters. 21 1 Its action was founded
rather upon improper use of its ports.
The German steamer Altntark was a naval auxiliary flying
the German official service flag. She had taken aboard in South
Atlantic waters some three hundred British seamen from ships
destroyed by the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf von
Spee,213 had reached the northern coast of Norway safely, and
was proceeding southward through Norwegian territorial waters
in an effort to reach a German port. The Altnark seems to have
been stopped three times by Norwegian warships. To a question
from the first the captain falsely replied that the ship was bound
from Port Arthur, Texas to Germany. He falsely stated to the
second that there were no persons aboard belonging to the enemy
forces or merchant marine of a belligerent. He refused to permit
search by the third on the ground that his ship had already been
visited. 214 Continuing southward under Norwegian naval escort
the Altmark was intercepted by the British destroyer Cossack,
which drove her into a fjord and removed the three hundred cap-
tives. This action was taken upon specific orders from the British
Admiralty after the Norwegian warships had once interposed.215
The British position, which attracted a good deal of favorable
comment in this country, 216 was that Norvay had failed to fulfill
her neutral obligations in permitting the Altmark to traverse
her territorial waters with captured British seamen aboard.217
2 1 2The Norwegian admiralty announced that the "City of Flint, with a
German prize crew aboard, had permission to use Norwegian territorial
waters from Troms6 southward." N. Y. Times, November 4, 1939, 1:8. Two
Norwegian naval vessels escorted her.
21SAs to which see p. 46 and note 233. For facts and commentary on
the Aitnark case see Borchard, Was Norway Delinquent in the Case
of the Altmark? (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. 289-294; 2 Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law, (6th ed.) sec. 3 25 A (554-556). 590, n. 8: Bulletin of
International News, February 4, 1940, 225-231, March 9, 1940, 291-293.
2l4Statement by Norwegian Foreign Minister, February 25, 1940.
N. Y. Times, February 26, 1940; Borchard, Was Norway Delinquent in
the Case of the Altmark? (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. 289.
215See statements of February 17, 1940 by British, Norwegian, and
German Admiralties; texts in N. Y. Times, February 18, 37:2-4.
-X6See statements and letters to editor of N. Y. Times, February 19
and 25, and March 10, 1940, and summary of them in Borchard,
Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the Altmark? (1940) 34 A. J. I. L.
289-290.
-17The Norwegian Government demanded the return of the liberated
captives and payment of damages for the violation of her territorial waters,
N. Y. Times, February 18, 1940. It also suggested submission of the
case to an international tribunal, ibid., February 27, 1940, p. 2. The
British rejection of these requests was brusque, being given in the first
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But the Altnuzark was a public ship, which the Norwegian authori-
ties had no right to search either in their territorial waters or their
ports. 21  Nor was Norway under any obligation to prohibit inno-
cent passage through her waters by the warship of a belligerent.
The privilege to permit such passage is recognized by international
law,2 19 and such permission is commonly given by domestic legis-
lation.2 2  The question then remains whether the passage of the
Altinark through territorial waters could be regarded as not inno-
cent because of the carriage of prisoners. No support for such a
case without even waiting for the official Norwegian protest. The first
position assumed by Great Britain was that Norwegian officials were
derelict in their duty in not searching the Almark when it entered terri-
torial -waters and releasing the prisoners; thereafter it advanced the view
that the character of the Altmark's transit of Norwegian waters could
not be considered innocent passage. See Prime Minister Churchill's state-
ment to Commons, N. Y. Times, February 21, 1940.21sStrictly speaking, the Altutark was a naval auxiliary. She flew
the German official service flag (Reiclhsdienstflagge), the use of which
is limited to vessels employed by the government for public purposes,
but is distinct from the war flag. Borchard, loc. cit., citing Decree of
October 31, 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1288. As a public vessel so engaged
she was immune from search by Norwegian officials. Lauterpacht,
however, has raised the question "whether an auxiliary vessel, not fully
converted into a man-of-war in accordance with the provisions of Hague
Convention No. VII is entitled to the full immunities enjoyed by a
man-of-war." Sixth ed. of Oppenheim, 590, n. S. But in so far as physical
features of the conversion are known to the writer there would seem to
have been substantial compliance with these regulations, and it would
appear an unreasonably strained interpretation which would accord a
prize greater immunities than an auxiliary naval vessel performing an
identical function. On the point that the converted vessel must comply
with the laws of war applicable to warships, the only question in this
case would be whether there was a genuine innocent passage, as to which
see note 221.219Cf. Hague Convention (No. 13) Concerning the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Articles 10 and 11 (2 Malloy, Treaties,
2360):
"Article 10. The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere
passage through its territorial waters of war ships or prizes belonging to
belligerents.
"Article 11. A neutral Power may allow belligerent war ships to
employ its licensed pilots."
It is pointed out in the report of Mr. Renault to the Hague Confer-
ence that Article 10 was inserted on the suggestion of Great Britain to
avoid interpretation of the preceding articles in such a way "as to prohibit
the mere passage through neutral waters in time of war by a warship or
auxiliary ship of a belligerent." (Italics supplied). Scott's Reports to the
Hague Conferences 847; Borchard, Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of
the Altmark? (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. 291.
220Thus the United States incorporated Article 10 of the Hague Con-
vention into the United States Naval Instructions of 1917, No. 2, p. 11.
Other countries permitting passage or entrance bf belligerent \varships
include Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Japan, Venezuela (Deik and
Jessup, Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties, I, 87, 554, 675, 723, 727.
736; II, 1292, Belgium, and the Scandinavian states (15 Rev. des lois, etc..
213-214, 214-217).
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view has been found. On the contrary there is British and
American authority against the release of prisoners brought into
neutral ports by belligerent warships.221 It does not appear in
what respect the conduct of either the Aitwark or the Norwvc-
gian authorities could be called illegal, and it is further apparent
that the British violation of Norwegian waters could not be
justified even if there were derelictions on the part of the
Altnark, so long as the Norwegian Government discharged its
neutral obligations. The incident must stand as a deliberate viola-
tion by the British Government of the rights of a small neutral.
Attention may be drawn in this connection to another incident,
much less dramatic in character but not dissimilar, which has
received little notice.2 22 The German freighter Diisseldarf was
captured in January by a British warship and sent under a prize
crew through the Panama Canal. A member of the captive Ger-
man crew feigned an attack of appendicitis during transit of the
221During the Franco-Prussian War a French warship entered the
Firth of Forth carrying German prisoners. A request by the German
consul at Leith for their release was rejected in the following language
(Fontes Juris Gentium, Digest of Diplomatic Correspondence, 1856-1871,
II, Document 2928):
"1. A French vessel-of-war having entered the Firth of Forth with
German prisoners on board, and the attention of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment having been called by the Consul of the North German Confedera-
tion at Leith to the circumstances, as a breach of neutrality on the part
of this country, Her Majesty's Government was legally advised as follows:
"'First, that the French warship had a right to enter the Firth of
Forth, and remain there during such time, and for such purposes, as are
allowed to belligerents in the present war under Her Majesty's Proclama-
tion.
"'Secondly, with regard to the assertion of the North German Consul.
that the German prisoners on board the French warship were. ipsojure, free, as the ship was in neutral waters; that there is no warrant in
the law of nations for such a position. So long as the Germans remained
on board the French warship they were under French jurisdiction, and
the neutral authorities had no right to interfere with them. If they had
been landed from the warship the question raised would have been dif-
ferent, as they would have passed out of French jurisdiction, and have
become practically free.'"
In the case of the Russian vessel Sitka, (1855) 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 122,
1 Pitt Cobbett's Leading Cases 269, Attorney General Cushing advised
that a United States court could not release captives on a prize brought
into San Francisco harbor during the Crimean War by a British warship.
Lauterpacht suggests that the release of the ship's crew and passengers,
and internment of the prize crew of the Appam were in contrast (6th ed,
of Oppenheim, 590, n. 8), but the cases are scarcely comparable since
the Appam was brought into port for indefinite sequestration Iending a
prize court determination. It does not appear that the determination to
release the ship's crew and passengers was reached until more than a
month after the vessel reached Hampton Roads. See review of the case i,
2 Hyde, International Law, sec. 862 (734-739).
2 22N. Y. Times, December 26, 1939, 1:7, D. 27, 2:2; January 22,
1940, 3:2.
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Canal and was taken off the ship for treatment. When he was
found to be perfectly well the question arose whether he ought
to be given his liberty or returned to British custody. He was
held in the Quarantine Station while the military authorities con-
sulted the Department of State, then turned over to the British
consul at Cristobal, C. Z. The consul in turn placed him aboard
a British cruiser bound for Bermuda, where he is understood to
have been interned. The position taken by the United States that
the British right to custody continued throughout the episode is
believed to be the correct one.
Clear evidence of belligerent carelessness of neutral rights
occurred in the Allied and German movements preliminary to the
occupation of Norway. On April 8 the Governments of Great
Britain and France issued a joint statement in which they an-
nounced that they had sown mines in the territorial waters of
Norway across the route normally followed by ore-ships moving
down the coast from Narvik, taking this action as a measure of
reprisal against Germany. The statement is such a characteristic
exposition of the present belligerent position with respect to
reprisals that it deserves to be quoted in part :223
"The position is, therefore, that Germany is flagrantly violat-
ing neutral rights in order to damage Allied countries while in-
sisting upon the strictest observance of the rules of neutrality
whenever such observance would provide some advantage to
herself.
"International law has alvays recognized the right of a bel-
ligerent when its enemy has systematically resorted to illegal
practices to take action appropriate to the situation created by the
illegalities of the enemy.
"Such action, even though not lawful in ordinary circum-
stances, becomes and is lawful in view of the other belligerent's
violation of law. The Allied Governments therefore hold them-
selves entitled to take such action as they may deem proper in
the present circumstances.
"If the successful prosecution of the war now requires them
to take such measures, world opinion will not be slow to realize
both the necessity under which they are constrained to act and
the purpose of their action. Their purpose in this war is to estab-
lish principles which the smaller States of Europe would them-
selves wish to see prevail and upon which the very existence of
those States ultimately depends.
"The Allies, of course, will never follow the German example
-
2 3Text in N. Y. Times, April 8, 1940.
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of brutal violence and any action they decide to take will always
be carried out in accordance with the dictates of humanity.
"His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the
French Government have accordingly resolved to deny continued
use by the enemy of stretches of territorial waters which are
clearly of particular value to him and they have therefore decided
to prevent the unhindered passage of vessels carrying contraband
of war through Norwegian territorial waters."
Although the writer is disposed, for his part, to accept the
view that the Allies are fighting for principles which lie at the
foundation of liberal institutions and free governments every-
where, he is unable to appreciate in what respect that fact can
affect the legal issue. Norway was entitled to its neutral status,
had been guilty of no dereliction of its duty as a neutral, and in-
vited no interference. The duty to respect neutral territory is as
strong upon the state which fights for high principle as that
which fights for low. If such reasoning as that which runs through
this note is to prevail it is difficult to see what limits could be put
upon illegal acts committed in the name of reprisal.
The mining of Norwegian waters was followed one day later
by the German occupation of Denmark and invasion of Norway.
The German Government of course seized upon the Allied breach
of Norwegian neutrality as a ground for extending its "protec-
tion" to the unfortunate neutrals, '2 but it has become apparent
that the German expedition was prepared long before and that
German troops and military equipment had been carried into
Norwegian ports below the decks of merchant vessels several
days previous to the invasion.2 21 Where both belligerents have
committed such patent and calculated breaches of neutrality in
efforts to strike at each other it is perhaps futile to inquire which
illegality was prior in time. It is enough to draw from the tin-
happy predicament of Norway the obvious lesson that no worse
fate can befall a neutral than to have its rights "protected" by a
belligerent.
In a very different category are the claims of the Pan-
American group of states to have a "security zone" comprising
waters adjacent to the American continents and extending from
300 to 600 miles out to sea "free from the commission of any
224Text in N. Y. Times, April 10, 1940, p. 10.
225See Norwegian White Paper on events leading to the invasion.
Text in N. Y. Times, April 21, 1940.
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hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation."2 26 This claim
was asserted in the Declaration of Panama "as of inherent right,"
although the document continues in milder terms with an under-
taking by the American Republics to make joint representations
to the belligerents, "to secure the compliance by them with the
provisions of this Declaration." 22 No ground is perceived upon
which such a novel extension of neutral immunities as that con-
templated could be made as a matter of right, although the Inter-
American Neutrality Committee 2s has sought to found it upon
"the fundamental law of self-protection, which must take forms
which are adequate to meet the new conditions presented by the
present war."229 The committee recommended, and the Habana
Consultative Meeting of foreign ministers accepted, certain inter-
pretations of the legal effects resulting from the creation of the
zone, according to which it was conceded that the waters of the
zone are not territorial in character and that all belligerents are
entitled to the use of the open sea for purposes of defense even
though the war was initiated by their aggression. Yet it was in-
220Dedaration of Panami, Resolution XIV of the Final Act (October
3, 1939) of the Panamii Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers. 1 Bul-
letin 321, at 331-333; (1940) 34 A. J. I. L., Supplement 17-18. The
waters of the zone are defined as follows: ". . . All waters comprised
within the limits set forth hereafter except the territorial Waters of Canada
and of the undisputed colonies and possessions of European countries
within these limits:
"Beginning at the terminus of the United States-Canada boundary in
Passamaquoddy Bay, in 44" 46' 36" north latitude, and 660 54' 11" west
longitude;
"Thence due east along the parallel 44* 46' 36" to a point 60* west of
Greenwich;
"Thence due south to a point in 20' north latitude;
"Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 5" north latitude, 240 west
longitude;
"Thence due south to a point in 20' south latitude;
"Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 58° south latitude, 57° west
longitude;
"Thence due west to a point in 80" west longitude;
"Thence by a rhumb line to a point on the equator in 97° west
longitude;
"Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 15" north latitude, 120" west
longitude;
"Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 48" 29' 38" north latitude,
136" west longitude;
"Thence due east to the Pacific terminus of the United States-
Canada boundary in the Strait of Juan de Fuca."
227Ibid., sections 1 and 3.
-
8 For the organization and functions of this Committee see infra, p.
208 et seq.
22 9Recommendations submitted to the Governments, Members of the
Pan American Union, April 27, 1940. Text in (1941) 35 A. J. I. L.,
Supplement, 38-43. Quotation from par. 3 of the preliminary statement.
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sisted that the American states might properly proscribe hostile
acts in the zone other than those of a defensive character or those
which began outside the zone and continued into it, and might
penalize the state which was the aggressor in the sense of having
provoked the particular encounter. 30
Nor did the committee consider general consent to the Declara-
tion a prerequisite to its legal effectiveness. Rather, its reasoning
seems to hinge upon the view that an aggressor under the Kellogg
Pact has no right to commit hostile acts on the high seas any
more than on land; the right of defense is thus supposed to be
given a preferred status in law, and the security zone is con-
sidered an appropriate application of the right of self-defense.23'
Apart from the fact that there exists no currently effective tech-
nique for determining which belligerent is the aggressor, nor any
obligatory sanction applicable to states which resort to war in
violation of their covenants, it is not perceived how any collec-
tive security device could be made the criterion of legal conduct
for neutrals. 32 Nor is there any perceptible relationship between
the right of self-defense and the right to have such an area free
from hostile acts not directed against the adjacent states. If it be
the safety of neutral commerce through such waters which is in
question, then the appropriate object of collective action by the
American Republics would seem to be insistence upon belligerent
respect for rights already clearly defined. The tendency for neutral
states to justify illegal interferences with well-recognized belliger-
ent rights by the catch-all phrase "self-defense" is in its way
quite as reprehensible as the belligerent attempt to justify all
manner of interference with neutral rights on the ground of re-
prisal against the enemy.
Certainly there has been neither acceptance nor observance of
the security zone by belligerents. Following the naval engagement
on December 13, 1939 between British cruisers and the German
pocket battleship Graf von Spee off the northeastern coast of
Uruguay,233 the twenty-one American Republics lodged a formal
23OIbid., esp. paragraphs I and 2 of the Resolution.
23'Cf. the statement by Willard Bunce Cowles in his Ross Prize
essay, Prospective Development of International Law in the Western
Hemisphere, as Affected by the Monroe Doctrine, (1941) 27 Am. B. A. J.,
342-349, at 343, 6. 1.
232 0n the incompatibility of the concepts of neutrality and collec-
tive security see McLaughlin, Legislative Neutrality in the United States,
22 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEW, (1938) 606-660, at 622-630; also Lautcrpacht,
Neutrality and Collective Security, (1936) 2 Politica 133-155.
233 The German pocket-battleship Graf von Spec was attempting
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protest with the governments of France, Great Britain, and Ger-
many." 4 The British and French replies denied that the Declara-
tion -of Panama could become legally effective as a restriction
upon their normal belligerent rights without their assent to it,
and suggested that a condition of assent must be assurance that
"adoption of the zone proposal would not provide German
warships and supply ships with a vast sanctuary from which they
could emerge to attack allied and neutral shipping, to which they
could return to avoid being brought to action, and in which some
un-neutral service might be performed by non-German ships, for
example by the use of wireless communications."
Specifically it was proposed that German warships be excluded
from the zone and German shipping interned.23 The German
Government also denied the effectiveness of the Declaration in
the absence of belligerent assent. While it professed a willingness
to enter into a further exchange of ideas on the subject it pointed
to the difficulty of equalizing the conditions between Germany
and the Allies because of territorial possessions of the latter on
the American continent which might become bases of military
operations, and because of the position of Canada. It algo ob-
jected strongly to the Allies' suggestion that German warships be
excluded from the zone as a condition of their assent to it.-30
A second joint protest was made to Great Britain on the occa-
sion of the scuttling of the German freighter JVakania about
fifteen miles from the Brazilian coast to avoid capture by a
British warship; 7 and a third, also to Great Britain, when the
German ship Hannover was scuttled in like circumstances near
the eastern coast of the Dominican Republic.2 3s Since then, al-
to overtake the French merchant vessel Formose between Brazil and the
port of 'Montevideo, within the "security zone," when engaged by the
British cruisers Achilles, Ajax, and Exeter. After suffering severe damage,
although apparently not seriously unseaworthy, she withdrew into the
port of" Montevideo. The Uruguayan authorities decided, over the protest
of the captain, that not more than 72 hours would be required to render
the ship seaworthy, and ordered it to leave on the expiration of that
period. The Graf von Spee then left port, transferred her personnel to the
German merchant vessel Tacoma and was scuttled by her crew in the
River Plate. When the Tacoma returned to port the personnel was interned.
1 Bulletin 697, 723.
2341 Bulletin 723.
235The quotation is from the British note, 2 Bulletin 199-201, at 200.
col. 1; but the French reply contains substantially the same points, ibid..
201-203.2361bid., 203-205.
-37Ibid 306. The incident occurred February 12, 1940; the protest
was made on March 16.
23Slbd., 568-569. The sinking occurred March 9. 1940; the protest
is not dated, but w-as communicated about May 24, 1940.
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though incidents have not been wanting, there has been no further
action, and interest in enforcement of the Declaration has sub-
sided. It seems not unfair to say that this result followed upon
realization that future violations of the zone are much more
likely to be by British warships than German. The Pan-American
conception of "self-defense" does not involve any fear of hostile
acts by Great Britain.
That neutral states may appropriately resort to joint declara-
tions or acts designed to protect their ports and waters from viola-
tion of their neutral status is of course not open to question.
The General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics
contains resolutions expressive of standards of conduct to be
observed by the several states in dealing with belligerent vessels
in their port and waters. 239 These include prevention of the use
of neutral territory as a base of belligerent operations; restriction
of the number of belligerent warships admitted into a neutral
port at one time and enforcement of a twenty-four hour limit
on their stay; inspection of the documents, cargo and passengers
of belligerent merchant vessels, and regulation of the quantity of
fuel supplied them; control of belligerent merchant vessels which
have sought asylum in neutral waters, and internment of those
which have declared false destinations, taken excessive time in
their voyages, or adopted the distinctive signs of warships; defi-
nition of defensively armed belligerent merchantmen in terms of
evidence as to their use for purely commercial purposes; exclu-
sion of belligerent submarines from "adjacent" (territorial?)
waters, or stipulation of the conditions of their admission.
The last point was elaborated further in recommendations
made by the Inter-American Neutrality Committee on February
2, 1940.240 These suggest that states which exclude belligerent
submarines from their ports or territorial waters should except
from the prohibition cases of force majeure, but require that in
the excepted cases the submarines should run on the surface
with superstructure visible and flag flying, signaling the cause
which forced entry and following prescribed routes or channels;
further, that there should be no exclusion of submarines from
waters where international freedom of passage prevails as a
2sgResolution V in the Final Act of the Panamfi Consultativ Mecet-
ing of Foreign Ministers; 1 Bulletin 321, at 326-328, (1940) 34 A. ..
I. L., Supplement, 1, 9-12.
24ORecommendation Relative to the Entry of Submarines into the
Ports and Territorial Waters of the American Republics, February 2.
1940. (1940) 34 A. J. I. L., Supplement, 78-80.
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matter of right. These conditions closely approximate those laid
down by President Roosevelt in his proclamation of November 4,
1939, excluding belligerent submarines pursuant to the authority
given him by the Neutrality Act of the same date.24' On the other
hand the Committee suggested that states permitting belligerent
submarines to enter should require them to run on the surface in
regular channels, with flags displayed, and to obtain special per-
mission in each case from the neutral government. Further, they
should be subjected to the usual rules governing the stay of bel-
ligerent warships in neutral ports.
In a separate recommendation of the same date the committee
also proposed a resolution designed to prevent the use of mer-
chant vessels as auxiliary transports of belligerent warships.2 -
This problem was an immediate one in view of the activities of
German merchant vessels like the Tacoma, which had operated
as an auxiliary of the Graf von Spec, and after assisting in the
scuttling of the warship had returned to the port of Montevideo.
The resolution begins with a declaration that "the neutral state
must take the means at its disposal to prevent its ports, harbors
and territorial waters from being utilized as bases of belligerent
operations in violation of the rules of international law, and for
this purpose it must likewise control the operation of merchant
vessels, whether of belligerent or neutral nationality, so as to
prevent them from using the said ports, harbors or jurisdictional
waters as bases from which to give assistance to the belligerents ;"24
then follow specific draft regulations. Except for services of a
purely humanitarian character, given spontaneously or in response
to a call for help, merchant vessels in neutral ports or waters are
required to refrain from assistance to belligerent warships. Any
assistance given would constitute the merchant ship an "auxiliary
belligerent vessel of war,"2 44 subject, together with its officers and
crew, to the rules of internment. Such internment would be for
the duration of the war in ports or roadsteads designated by the
neutral state and under such surveillance as it thought neces-
sary.2 - 5 It was suggested further that rigid inspections of the
papers, cargoes, and prolosed movements of belligerent merchant
vessels be instituted by the neutral state in order to prevent them
24lProclamation No. 2375; 4 Fed. Reg. 4494, 1 Bulletin 456, (1940)
34 A. J. I. L., Supplement 56.
242(1940) 34 A. J. I. L., Supplement, 80-82.
24Ibid., Article I.
2441bid., Article II.
245Ibid., Article III.
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from leaving port with equipment, supplies, or fuel which might
serve to implement belligerent warships. Declarations by the cap-
tain and agent or owner that a proposed voyage was solely for
commercial purposes might be required, and in suspicious cases
the posting of a bond against the return of a certificate of delivery
obtained in the port of destination. 2
4
r
Such efforts to standardize the regulations employed in secur-
ing the neutral status of American ports and waters according
to recognized principles of international law are useful, and might
in case of need become the basis for joint measures of enforce-
ment.
V. THE ENFORCEMENT OF NEUTRAL RiGrs
It is to be feared that a traveler from some other world, ob-
serving the situation which has been described, would have diffi-
culty in comprehending what we mean by neutral rights, unless,
indeed, he should conclude that the right to protest is meant.
Submarine warfare in disregard of the law of warning, visit and
search, and without provision for the crews of torpedoed vessels;
laying of mines in commercial sea lanes and along neutral coasts
without notice; a~rial bombing and strafing of neutral merchant-
men or trawlers; contraband rules which permit the interception
of all goods passing to an enemy directly or through adjacent
neutral states; "blockade" by contraband control without thought
of preventing access to the enemy's coast; continuous voyage ap-
plied to blockade and to conditional contraband tinder regulations
appropriate to absolute contraband; rules of evidence before prize
courts which impose an impossible burden upon neutral claimants;
diversion of neutral ships into control ports without visit and search
or capture; removal and examination of neutral mails, including
postal correspondence; improper removal of enemy persons from
neutral ships; attempted sequestration of prizes in neutral ports;
above all the irresponsible attitude that no breach of neutral right
is too great if only it can be labeled a reprisal against some illegal
conduct of the enemy-these are the practical measure of respect
for neutral rights today! True, these practices are violations of
law, and have been widely denounced as such. But a law which is
habitually and continuously vio!ated cannot endure permanently
upon the strength of formal protests. Candor compels the admis-
sion that certain recognized neutral rights will soon be reduced
2461bid., Article V.
THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS
to a condition of "innocuous desuetude" unless some method can
be found for compelling belligerents to respect them.
There are several approaches to this problem. One is to recog-
nize frankly that the old basis of compromise between belligerent
and neutral interests is no longer tenable and to seek a new
balance of interest which will commend itself to both as a practical
compromise. This procedure has the advantage of appealing to
the self-interest of both neutrals and belligerents as the guaranty
of respect for the provisions of the plan. It necessarily assumes
that a plan can be devised which will sufficiently reconcile the
interests of both.
A draft convention on The Rights and Ditties of Areutral
States in Naval and Airial War2, 4 has been prepared for the
Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School by a
group of experts -8 working along these lines. Proceeding from
the assumption that no satisfactory definition of contraband is any
longer possible, the Harvard draft would simply abolish the whole
principle of contraband of war. The belligerent right of blockade
is retained and extended somewhat in recognition "of the inevit-
able point of view of belligerents who will never tolerate the free
shipment of essential war materials to the enemy if they have the
physical power to prevent it."i24s Apart from blockade belligerents
are given the right to intercept goods having a belligerent destina-
tion and- to condemn them "if they are: (i) destined by sea to a
blockaded port or place; (ii) arms, ammunition or implements of
war; (iii) shipped in violation of the laws of the shipping neutral;
(iv) infected by other goods; (v) of belligerent ownership and
in a belligerent vessel or a vessel engaged in unneutral service;
(vi) the property of the owner, charterer, or master of a vessel
engaged in unneutral service."250 Other goods having a belligerent
destination may be preempted. The practical effect of these ineas-
ures is to retain the belligerent right to condemn goods tradition-
ally classified as absolute contraband, but to substitute preemption
for condemnation of conditional contraband.
247Publisbed in (1939) 33 A. J. I. L., Supplement to No. 3.
24SReporter, Philip C. Jessup; Assistant Reporter, Oliver J. Lissitzyn;
Advisers, Edwin M. Borchard, Herbert XV. Briggs, Charles K. Burdick,
Frederic R. Coudert, Francis Deik, Allen W. Dulles, Clyde Eagleton,
Charles G. Fenvick, George A. Finch, James XV. Garner, Green H.
Hackvorth, Howard T. Kingsbury, Arthur K. Kuhn, James Grafton
Rogers, Edgar Turlington, Van XVechten Veeder, Charles Warren, George
Grafton Wilson, Francis Colt De Xolf, Lester H. Woolsey, Quincy Wright.249Harvard Research, Neutrality, 499-500. For proposed rules of mari-
time blockade see section 9.
25OIbid., 502.
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With respect to neutral trade with neutrals tile draft proposes
to authorize interception and condemnation if the goods "are:
(i) arms, ammunition or implements of war ultimately destined
for a belligerent; (ii) other goods which the shipping neutral him-
self has forbidden to be exported; (iii) infected by the presence
of condemnable goods; (iv) of belligerent ownership and carried
in a belligerent vessel or a vessel engaged in unneutral service;
(v) the property of the owner, charterer, or master of a vessel
engaged in unneutral service; (vi) destined by sea for a blockaded
port or place; (vii) goods in excess of a quota."' Other goods
having a neutral destination may be preempted at the market price
current in the captor's territory plus ten percent. Thus the doc-
trine of continuous voyage, or rather of ultimate destination, is
retained in substance for absolute contraband but applied to
blockade only when the last lap of the transportation to the block-
aded port or coast is by sea. The right given belligerents to con-
demn neutral imports in excess of quotas and thus to prevent
transshipment of surpluses to belligerents, necessitates the crea-
tion of administrative apparatus in the form of mixed neutral-
belligerent quota boards, which would fix quotas of neutral im-
ports in terms of the average annual peace time importation of
commodities during a five year period next preceding six months
prior to the outbreak of the war.112 Provision is also made for
inspection of neutral vessels and cargoes by authorized officials
of the neutral state in which the voyage begins. and issuance of
certificates of neutrality when the cargo is not such as to be sub-
ject to condemnation either by reason of its character or its hav-
ing been shipped in excess of the quota of the neutral receiving
state.2 5 3 Coupled with full publicity as to the movements of such
certified ships, 2 54 this device gives the belligerent assurance of
the legitimacy of the voyage and facilitates the exercise of its
option to preempt. At the same time it is likely to eliminate many
of the present abuses of the right of visit and search and the
danger of sinking neutral vessels by mistake.
It is useless to quibble over details of the Harvard Draft in
view of the Reporter's statement that the proposals outlined above
are "designed merely to suggest the general outlines of a possible
-2511bid., 501-502.
2 52For preemption, ibid., Article 63(h), p. 634 et seq. For the quota
system, ibid.. Article 47, p. 522 et seq.; Article 63(f), pp. 632-634; Annex
III., pp. 812-817.
-
25
-bid.. Articles 41-46, pp. 505-522, and Annex II, pp. 806-812.254Ibid., Article 42, pp. 515-516.
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international agreement on neutral trade which, if accepted in
principle, would undoubtedly require modification in detail."2 5
The writer is inclined to believe that a realistic view of the present
situation strongly supports the general position taken. Some com-
promise with the belligerents' assertion of the right to intercept
enemy goods without regard to the traditional rules of blockade,
contraband and continuous voyage would seem to afford the only
hope of an agreed basis for neutral rights of commerce.
On the other hand there can be no compromise over destruction
of neutral shipping by illegal methods of warfare, nor over the
irresponsible use of the doctrine of reprisals as an omnibus justi-
fication for illegal conduct. Against such violations of their rights
neutrals must find a method of effective resistance. Here it ap-
pears to the writer that the most promising approach lies in neu-
tral collaboration or collective neutrality. Such action has been
suggested frequently, 56 but has been retarded by two factors.
In the first place there has not hitherto been any general recogni-
tion of the right of a neutral which has not suffered a direct
injury to its neutral rights to intervene on behalf of an injured
neutral.2 5 7 Yet there are exceptions to this attitude in the practice
of states, 258 and it would seem sound in principle to regard a
violation of the international law of neutrality as a breach of the
rights of all neutrals, since they have a common concern in main-
taining the fabric of neutral rights unimpaired. - " A recognition
-55Ibid., 487-488.25 See Jessup's proposals in Neutrality, Its History, Economics and
Law, Vol. IV: Today and Tomorrow, esp. 160ff. for review of earlier
efforts to secure collaboration among neutrals; Lammasch, in Recueil de
rapports sur les diffrents points du programme-minimum, Organisation
Centrale pour une Paix Durable, 1, 303; Nippold, Die Gestaltung des
V6lkerrechts nach dem Weltkrieg, 53 ff.2 57 1t has of course been quite common to protest against violations of
the neutrality of other states, but this has been put upon humanitarian
grounds rather than upon a legal interest in the result. See generally,
Harvard Research, Neutrality, Article 114 and comment (788-793).
-
58ln the Carthage and the Mfanouba cases France presented to the
Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration claims for damages re-
sulting from breach of international common lawv, but the court did not feel
itself competent to award anything in addition to the loss actually suffered
by the owners of the vessel. Scott, Hague Court Reports, 1916, p. 557.
The removal by the United States of Messrs. Mason and Slidell from the
Trent .evoked protests from Austria, France, Italy, Prussia and Russia.
See Harvard Research Draft, 791-793. A joint declaration of the American
Republics was issued May 19, 1940, protesting the invasion of Belgium,
Holland, and Luxemburg by Germany. 2 Bulletin 541-542, 568.
259Cf. statement of Root, The Outlook for International Law, Pro-
ceedings of the Am. Soc. of Int. L., 1915, pp. 8-10; quoted in Harvard
Research, Neutrality, 789-790: "Up to this time breaches of international
law have been treated as we treat wrongs under civil procedure, as if they
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of this principle might well be incorporated into any international
agreement looking to the revision of the law of neutrality2 ° In the
second place there has never been any machinery for collective
action by neutrals. It is believed essential to the effectiveness of
such a method that there be continuing organization as a vehicle
for neutral collaboration. The first indications of such organiza-
tion have appeared recently in consequence of the resolutions
adopted by the Inter-American Consultative Meetings held by
the foreign ministers of the American Republics in Panama in
1939 and Habana in 1940.
A foundation for collective action had been laid in earlier
Pan-American conventions, for the Argentine Anti-War Treaty
of 1933 contained an undertaking, on the part of the American
states, in the event that any one of them should be engaged in
war "to adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary
attitude. '26 1 Again, the Convention to Co6rdinate Existing Treat-
ies between the American States, signed at Buenos Aires in 1936,
contemplated a joint neutrality designed to localize conflicts or
prevent their prolongation. Agreement upon a consultative pro-
cedure was reached.2 6 2 These treaties referred to conflicts between
concerned nobody except the particular nation upon which the injury was
inflicted and the nation inflicting it. There has been no general recognition
of the right of other nations to object . . . in general, states not directly
affected by the particular injury complained of have not been deemed to
have any right to be heard about it .... If the law of nations is to be
binding ... there must be a change in theory, and violations of the law of
such a character as to threaten the peace and order of the community of
nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every civilized
nation to have the law maintained and a legal injury to every nation ...
Wherever in the world the laws which should protect the independence of
nations, the inviolability of their territory, the lives and property of their
citizens, are violated, all other nations have a right to protest against the
breaking down of the law. Such a protest would not be an interference in
the quarrels of others. It would be an assertion of the protesting nation's
own right against the injury done to it by the destruction of the law upon
which it relies for its peace and security."
-GOThe following draft declaration is proposed in the Harvard Re-
search Draft on Neutrality: "The High Contracting Parties declare that
every neutral State has a direct interest in the observance by belligerents
of the law defining neutral rights, and a violation by a belligerent of a
neutral right of one neutral state constitutes a violation of a neutral right
of all neutral state." Additional Declaration. Article 114.
-6oArticle 3. This is the so-called Saavedra Lamas Treaty, of October
10, 1933. Text in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 906; (1934), 28 A. J. I. L.
Supplement. 79.
-62Convention to Co6rdinate, Extend, and Assure the Fulfillment of
the Existing Treaties between the American States, Ariiclc 6; text in 31
A. J. I. L. (1937), Supplement. 53 ff., Pan American Union, Congress and
Conference Series, No. 22, p. 37. Cf. the Convention for the Maintenance,
Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace (1936), Articles I and 2,
Pan American Union, op. cit., No. 22, p. 33.
THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS
American states and in no sense bound the signatories to a unified
neutrality in the case of a European war. A step toward the latter
end, however, was taken in 1938 at the Lima Conference, where
it was agreed that the procedure of consultation previously
adopted for the maintenance of peace might be applied "on the
initiative of one or more Governments and with the previous
agreement of the others, to any economic, cultural or other ques-
tion which, by reason of its importance, justifies this procedure."
The personal attendance of the ministers of foreign affairs or their
specially authorized representatives could be invoked when neces-
sary.2 63 At the same time the well known Declaration of the
Principles of the Solidarity of America ("Declaration of Lima")
was adopted.2 6 4 In it the governments of the American states
declare:
"First. That they reaffirm their continental solidarity and their
purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon
which the said solidarity is based.
"Second. That faithful to the above-mentioned principles and
to their absolute sovereignty, they reaffirm their decision to main-
tain them and to defend them against all foreign intervention or
activity that may threaten them.
"Third. And in case the peace, security or territorial integrity
of any American Republic is thus threatened by acts of any
nature. that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern
and their determination to make effective their solidarity, co-
6rdinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the proce-
dure of consultation, established by conventions in force and by
declarations of the Inter-American Conferences, using the meas-
ures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. It
is understood that the Governments of the American Republics
will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing
fully their juridical equality as sovereign States.
"Fourth. That in order to facilitate the consultations estab-
lished in this and other American peace instruments, the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, when deened
desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in
their several capitals by rotation and without protocolary charac-
-ter. Each Government may; under special circumstances or for
special reasons, designate a representative as a substitute for its
Minister of Foreign Affairs."
263Eighth International Conference of American States, Final Act, No.
CVII; 34 A. J. I. L. (1940), Supplement, 190, at 199, Pan American
Union, op. cit., No. 27, p. 92; International Conciliation, No. 349 (April,1939).
264Ibid., No. CIX; 34 A. J. I. L. (1940), Supplement, 199-200; Inter-
national Conciliation, No. 349 (April, 1939), 242-243.
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On the basis of these arrangements the foreign ministers met
at Panamai, September 23 to October 3, 1939, to consider the
situation presented by the outbreak of the European war. The
conference was notable for several steps affecting joint neutrality:
the creation of the "security zone" already discussed (Declara-
tion of Panam.) ;26 the position taken on foodstuffs and clothing
as contraband ;266 the General Declaration of Neutrality of the
American Republics ;267 and the establishment of two technical
committees, the Inter-American Financial and Economic Ad-
visory Committee, 20 8 and the Inter-American Neutrality Com-
mittee.26
59
The General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Re-
publics is a unique document which deserves attention. According
to the preamble it "presupposes common and solidary attitudes
with reference to situations of force which, as in the case of the
present European War, may threaten the security of the sover-
eign rights of the American Republics." Since the attitude as-
sumed with reference to the war was a determination not to
265Supra, pp. 194-198.266Pan American Union, Congress and Conference Series, No. 29, p.
17; (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. Supplement, 13; supra, 45-46.267Final Act, Resolution V. Text in (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. Supple-
ment, 9-12.26SIbid., Resolution III. Text in (1940) 34 A. J. I. L. Supplement
6-9. The Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee is
a body of 21 experts, one for each state, having its headquarters in Wash-
ington, D. C. Its functions include the consideration of monetary and
exchange problems referred to it by any member-state and the making of
recommendations; study of the means of obtaining stability in monetary
and commercial relationships between the American Republics; acting
through the Pan American Union as a clearing house for exchange of
information on monetary and fiscal matters, foreign trade, customs legis-
lation, etc.; study of the most effective measures for cooperative effort in
lessening dislocations caused by the war; of the possibility of tariff reduc-
tions; of the necessity for creating an inter-American institution to insure
permanent financial co6peration between the treasuries and central banks
of the several states; of measures to promote importation and consumption
of American products, especially through lowering prices and improving
transportation and credit facilities; of the need for a Commercial Institute
to maintain contacts between importers and exporters and to supply data
to them; of the possibility of promoting new industries and negotiating
commercial treaties; of the practicability of using silver as one of the
mediums for international payments. Results of these studies and recoi-
mendations of the Committee are to be communicated to all the states
through the Pan American Union. On April 26, 1941 the Committee re-
solved to recommend to the Governments that idle foreign-flag vessels
in American ports be requisitioned and put into service. Further plans to
this end were announced on August 28, 1941. (1941) 35 A. J. I. L.
Supplement, 198-201.
269Final Act of Panama. Consultative Meeting, Resolution V, sec. 5;
(1940), 34 A. J. I. L. Supplement, p. 12.
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become involved it became "desirable to state the standards of
conduct, which, in conformity with international law and their
respective internal legislation, the American Republics propose
to follow, in order to maintain their status as neutral states and
fulfill their neutral duties, as well as -require the recognition of
the rights inherent in- such a status." The Declaration then out-
lines in some detail certain standards of conduct recognized by the
American states as appropriate to the status of neutrality. They
include prevention of use of their terrestrial, maritime and aErial
territories as bases of belligerent operations; prevention of un-
neutral acts by inhabitants of their territories; prevention of
local enlistment or inducement to go abroad to enlist in the armed
forces of a belligerent, of setting on foot military, naval or aErial
expeditions in service of a belligerent, of establishment or use by
belligerents of radio stations in their territories; application to
warships of the rules prohibiting more than three at one time in
a neutral port, or a stay of more than twenty-four hours; insist-
tence upon respect for rules of international law governing the
conduct of belligerent vessels and aircraft in areas under neutral
jurisdiction and control; prohibition of flights by belligerent mili-
tary aircraft over their territory, and close regulation of flights
by non-military aircraft in order to prevent deviation from
regular routes or improper use of radiotelegraphy. These are
rather routine statements of neutral duty which in themselves call
for no comment, apart from the fact of their having been jointly
announced. Among neutral rights asserted in the Declaration are
inspection of passengers, papers, and cargo of belligerent merchant
vessels, and limitation of fuel supplied, in order to prevent auxili-
ary service to warships; control over belligerent merchantmen
which have sought asylum in neutral waters, and internment of
those whose conduct places them under suspicion of giving aid to
warships or cruising as raiders; transfer of merchant vessels
from the flag of one American Republic to that of another, pro-
vided the transfer is in good faith, without agreement for resale
to the vendor, and completed in American territorial waters;
denial of obligation to assimilate belligerent armed merchantmen
to warships "if they do not carry more than four six-inch guns
mounted on the stern, and their lateral decks are not reinforced,
and if, in the judgment of the local authorities, there do not exist
other circumstances which reveal that the merchant vessels can
be used for offensive purposes;" exclusion of belligerent sub-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
marines from waters adjacent to neutral territories, or admission
of them upon condition of -conformity to local regulations.
Having stated this general framework of regulations the draft-
ers of the Declaration concluded it with a provision creating the
Inter-American Neutrality -Committee, to be composed of seven
experts in international law designated by the Governing Board
of the Pan-American Union before November 1, 1939.270 The
committee was charged with "studying and formulating recom-
mendations with respect to the problems of neutrality, in the light
of experience and changing circumstances," its recommendations
to be transmitted, through the Pan American Union, to the govern-
ments of the American Republics. Elsewhere in the Final Act
of the Consultative Meeting was a recommendation that the sev-
eral governments transmit to the Pan American Union the texts
of all the decrees and regulations approved by each relative to its
neutrality, so that the Union might communicate copies of these
documents to the other governments.2 ' Thus a central clearing
house of information was assured.
The committee established itself in Rio de Janeiro. Its work
consisted in the early stages in drafting recommendations upon
problems referred to it by various American states. This phase
has been sufficiently indicated by the account given of its views
on belligerent interception of neutral postal correspondence, 2 2 on
foodstuffs and clothing as contraband, 2 3 on admission of sub-
marines to neutral ports and waters,274 and on the legal effects of
the "security zone. '275 When the Graf von Spee incident oc-
curred the committee inquired, through the Pan American Union,
whether the various states wished it to assume jurisdiction over
questions involving the "security zone," inasmuch as the Declara-
tion of PanamA, which created the zone, was an instrument
separate from the General Declaration of Neutrality, from which
270The original members were the following: Luiz A. Podesti Costa,
of Argentina; Afranio de Mello Franco, of Brazil; Mariano Fontecilla, of
Chile; Alejandro de Aguilar Machado, of Costa Rica; Charles G. Fen-
wick, of the United States; Roberto C6rdova, of Mexico; and Gustavo
Herrera of Venezuela. Manuel F. Himenez replaced Aguilar Machado in
March, 1940; Salvador Martinez Mercado replaced C6rdova in May, 1940:
and Eduardo Labougle replaced Podestfi Costa in October, 1940. Fenwick,
The Inter-American Neutrality Committee, (1941) 35 A. J. 1. L. 12-40,
fn. 10.271Final Act of Panamfi Consultative Meeting, Resolution 1 (1940)
34 A. J. I. L. Supplement, p. 5.27-Supra, pp. 182-183.
273Supra, pp. 45-46.
274Supra, pp. 198-199.275Supra, pp. 195-196.
THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS
the committee derived its authority. The inquiry was answered
unanimously in the affirmative. Thereafter, at the second Con-
sultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held at Habana, July 21
to 30, 1940, the work of the committee was approved, and new
tasks were assigned to it. It was asked, first, to draft a preliminary
project of convention "dealing with the juridical effects of the
security zone and the measures of international cobperation which
the American states are ready to adopt to obtain respect for the
said zone;" second, to draft a general inter-American con'~ention
"which will cover completely all the principles and rules generally
recognized in international law in matters of neutrality, and espe-
cially those contained in the resolutions of Panami, in the indi-
vidual legislation of the different American states, and in the
recommendations already presented by the same committee."
Pending the completion of this project and its deposit in the Pan
American Union for signature, adhesion and ratification by the
several Governments, it was recommended that they incorporate
into their domestic legislation the principles contained in the
resolutions of Panam6. and in the recommendations of the com-
mittee.276
The task of drafting a general neutrality convention was cer-
tainly a formidable one at best, considering the controversial status
of many of the problems which have been discussed in these pages.
For the committee it was rendered even more difficult by the
fact that some, at least, of their number believed that the institu-
tion of war had been outlaved, and doubted that neutrality as a
status had any "future." Hence they were reluctant to proceed
with a codification which would stand as an implied acceptance of
the view that war is an institution which must be recognized and
that it is a useful approach to seek mitigation of its effects by
international legal restrictions.2 7- The attitude thus revealed sug-
2 76 Final Act and Convention of the Habana Consultative Meeting.
July, 1940; Resolution I. (1941) 35 A. J. I. L. Supplement, 5-6; 3
Bulletin 129-130.
277See particularly the comment by Charles G. Fenwick, the member
from the United States, The Inter-American Neutrality Committee, (1941)
35 A. J. I. L. 12, 40: ". . . But the time had passed when war could be
accepted as a legal procedure. The experience of the Vorld WVar, and even
more so of the present war, had shown that the institution of war, as it
was understood at The Hague in 1907, could not be restrained and kept
within legal bounds; that war was essentially a lawless and anarchical
procedure which tended of its very nature to break through all restraints;
and that neutrality was of itself no protection for the small state, no
matter how careful it might be to fulfill the duties which the status of
neutrality imposed upon it. There was, therefore, no 'future' for neutrality.
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gests the probability that in all its work the committee may have
been dominated less by the desire to develop and implement the
international law of neutrality as an effective safeguard against
belligerent abuses generally than to use what it considered the
vestiges of an outworn law as part of a new security program
against one particular belligerent. The same attitude was indi-
cated in a covering letter transmitting to the Director of the Pan
American Union the committee's recommendations on interference
with neutral postal correspondence. There it observed that it had
formulated these recommendations "for the purpose of contribut-
ing to a solution of the problem presented to it, without, how-
ever, failing to realize that the problem is of relatively little im-
portance compared with the appalling violations of the law of
neutrality resulting from the invasion of neutral territories by
the forces of one of the belligerents." ' This statement is not
introduced for the purpose of quibbling over the committee's
failure to distinguish between the refusal to admit neutral status
shown by making war on the neutral and a violation of the rights
of a state whose neutral status is admitted, but rather because it
shows a basic difficulty which has been unusually conspicuous
during the present war. That is the more or less conscious tendency
to identify neutrality with a kind of discriminatory non-belliger-
ency. This may take the form of a revival of the imperfect neu-
trality of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggested by
the dictum of Grotius: "It is the duty of neutrals to do nothing
which may strengthen the side which has the worse cause, or which
may impede the motions of him who is carrying on a just var.-'' T9
Even this degree of discrimination is, however, insufficient to
satisfy many of the advocates of collective security, who seem
Any attempt to codify its principles and rules as a basis of neutral conduct
in a future war was not merely futile in so far as the practical value of the
code was concerned; it was an implied recognition that international law
was unequal to the task of distinguishing between right and wrong, be-
tween good faith in the observance of treaty obligations of peaceful pro-
cedure and the recourse to violence for the attainment of national objectives.
Between the rule of force and the rule of law there could be no compromise.
It was one thing for the American nations to seek to remain aloof from
the present war which it was now too late to prevent by concerted action:
it was another thing to accept war in principle, which would be the logical
inference from an attempt to codify rules of neutrality for the future."
278Quoted by Fenwick, The Inter-American Neutrality Committee.
(1941) 35 A. J. I. L. 31.
2793 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), c. XVII, par. III, I
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unwilling to dissociate neutrality from the attitudes and obligations
appropriate to collective security. -0
With such a view it is easy to feel sympathy, but there is a
very real danger that in confusing neutrality with discriminatory
collective action against aggressor states we may destroy the dis-
tinctive qualities and values of a status upon which many states
may sometimes wish to rely. Even if the general proposition be
admitted that the flowering of the international law of neutrality
in the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth
corresponded to a general belief that war as an institution was
receding, and that the principal security problem of the future
would be the localization of minor conflicts, it does not follow
that the appropriate conditions for neutrality never recur. Local
wars continue to occur, and there continue to be some states whose
genuine desire to occupy a position of neutrality in great wars
wili be respected by the belligerents. It appears to the writer that
the interest of the United States in the present war does not lie in
impartial treatment of the belligerents, but that position may, be
perfectly appropriate for many states of Central and South
America, is still appropriate for Switzerland, Sweden and Por-
tugal, and in the view of the Department of State might be more
appropriate for Finland than the status it now occupies. It would
therefore seem wiser to admit that great differences exist in the
interest which states will feel in a collective security program or
in individual acts of partiality toward a belligerent. The status of
neutrality in the traditional sense ought to continue available to
genuinely disinterested states. By the same token it ought not to
be appropriated by states whose intentions are not impartial. No
reason is perceived why perfectly clear lines of distinction can-
not be drawn between belligerency, participation in collective
security, individual intervention by unneutral service, and neutrality.
The experience of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee
therefore illustrates a feature of collective neutrality which may
require further attention. Perhaps a way will need to be devised
whereby participating states can promptly be excluded from such
-SOSee a careful and detailed study by Georg Colin, Chief of the
International Law Section of the Danish Foreign Office, entitled Neo-
Neutrality (1939). The author traces the relationship of neutrality to
collective security in the policies of recent years. His own conclusions are
moderate. His Neo-Neutrality involves non-participation in war but col-
laboration in efforts to prevent it. On the whole, however, it may be
doubted if this unnecessary use of the word "neutrality," even in a
aualifving hyihenstion. has not oroduced a certain confusion of categories.
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a group when they are no longer prepared to observe the obliga-
tions of neutrality. If there are today states of the Pan American
Union which genuinely wish to be neutral the United States may
do them great disservice by continuing to associate itself with inter-
American neutrality. There is undoubtedly a place for both inter-
American neutrality and inter-American intervention, but not
under the same title and auspices.
On the other hand it seems clear that a very significant achieve-
ment in the development of machinery for collective action by
neutrals has occurred. Apparatus for prompt consultation in deter-
mination of policy and for regular examination of technical prob-
lems by experts has been put into successful operation. There is
the further advantage that it was built upon previously laid foun-
dations of collaboration and that over-organization was avoided.
Thus there is less of the artificial and brittle quality than ordinarily
attaches to novel institutions. Were it possible at the conclusion
of the war to obtain general assent to proposals of the sort con-
tained in the Harvard Research Draft the prospect of putting them
into successful operation in a future conflict would be greatly
increased by the continuation and active efforts of this type of
Pan American organization. It might well be expanded by the
inclusion of other blocs of traditionally neutral states, such as the
Scandinavian countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
It is of course possible that these encouraging developments
have come too late. We hardly know what international polity
may emerge from the present debacle, nor whether states will
come to feel again that they can afford to entrust their security to
a policy of neutrality, however well implemented. Yet if the will
to maintain the status of neutrality should continue, the basis and
the means of doing so seem within reach.
